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ABSTRACT
Several programs have been proposed to improve incentives for research on vaccines for
malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV, and to help increase accessibility of vaccines once they are
developed. The U.S. administration’s budget proposes a tax credit that would match each dollar of
vaccine sales with a dollar of tax credit. The World Bank has proposed a $1 billion fund to provide
concessional loans to countries to purchase vaccines if and when they are developed. European
political leaders have spoken favorably about the concept of a vaccine purchase fund.  This paper
explores the design of such programs, focusing on commitments to purchase new vaccines.
For vaccine purchase commitments to spur research, potential vaccine developers must
believe that the sponsor will not renege on the commitment once vaccines have been developed and
research costs sunk. Courts have ruled that similar commitments are legally binding contracts. Given
appropriate legal language, the key determinant of credibility will therefore be eligibility and pricing
rules, rather than whether funds are physically set aside in separate accounts. The credibility of
purchase commitments can be enhanced by specifying rules governing eligibility and pricing of
vaccines in advance and insulating those interpreting these rules from political pressure through long
terms.
Requiring candidate vaccines to meet basic technical requirements, normally including
approval by some regulatory agency, such as the U.S. FDA, would help ensure that funds were spent
only on effective vaccines. Requiring developing to contribute co-payments would help ensure that
they felt that the vaccines were useful given the conditions in their countries.  
The U.S. Orphan Drug Act’s success in stimulating research and development is widely
attributed to a provision awarding market exclusivity to the developer of the first drug for a condition
unless subsequent drugs are clinically superior. Purchases under a vaccine purchase program could
be governed by a similar market exclusivity provision.A purchase commitment program could start by offering a fairly modest price. If this proved
inadequate to spur sufficient research, the promised price could be increased. This procedure mimics
auctions, which are often efficient procurement methods when costs are unknown. As long as prices
do not rise at a rate substantially greater than the interest rate, vaccine developers would not have
incentives to withhold vaccines from the market.  
The World Bank has termed health interventions costing less than $100 per year of life saved
as highly cost effective for poor countries. If donors pledge approximately $250 million per year for
each vaccine for ten years, vaccine purchases would cost approximately $10 per year of life saved.
It is unlikely that vaccines for all three diseases would be developed simultaneously, but if donors
wanted to limit their exposure, they could cap their total promised vaccine spending under the
program, for example at $520 million annually. No funds would be spent or pledges called unless
a vaccine were developed.  
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Several initiatives have recently been proposed to create incentives for research on
vaccines against diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and AIDS, and to increase accessibility
of vaccines once they are developed.  The president of the World Bank recently said that the
institution is planning to establish a $1 billion fund to help finance purchases of new vaccines, if
and when they are developed [Financial Times, 2000].  The U.S. administration’s 2000 budget
includes a tax credit for vaccine sales that would effectively double the developing country
market for new vaccines against diseases that kill more than one million people each year
[http://www.treas.gov/taxpolicy/library/grnbk00.pdf].  The tax credits would be capped at $1
billion over ten years.  The concept of a vaccine purchase fund has also received support from
European political leaders [www.auswartiges.amt.de, 1999].
Although malaria, tuberculosis, and African strains of AIDS kill almost 5 million people
each year, they are the subject of little vaccine research.  Potential vaccine developers fear that
they would not be able to sell enough vaccines at a high enough price to recoup their research
investments.  This is both because these diseases primarily affect poor countries, and because
vaccine markets are severely distorted.  The proposed programs could both create incentives for
vaccine research and help improve access to any vaccines developed (see the companion paper,
“Creating Markets for New Vaccines: Part I: Rationale”).  They would not require any
expenditure unless and until vaccines were developed.
This paper addresses the many design issues that would arise in establishing such
programs.  It focuses on the design of a vaccine purchase commitment, but much of the analysis
carries over to the analysis of tax credits and a World Bank loan fund.  Policymakers considering
establishing such programs face a host of questions.  How can commitments be made credible to
vaccine developers?  How should eligibility of candidate vaccines be determined?  What pricesIntroduction 2
should be paid for vaccines, and should these prices vary with vaccine characteristics?  If
multiple vaccines are developed, which should be purchased?  Should recipient countries provide
co-payments, and if so, how much?  How cost effective would such programs be?
If potential vaccine developers are to invest in research, they must believe that once they
have sunk funds into developing a vaccine, the sponsors of a vaccine purchase program will not
renege on their commitments by paying a price that covers only the cost of manufacturing, and
not research.  Section 1 of this paper discusses factors affecting the credibility of a vaccine
purchase commitment.  Courts have held that similar public commitments to reward contest
winners or to purchase specified goods constitute legally binding contracts and that the decisions
of independent parties appointed in advance to adjudicate such programs are binding.  This
suggests that if programs contain appropriate legal language, the key determinant of their
credibility will not be whether funds are physically set aside in a separate account, but the rules
determining eligibility and pricing, and the procedures for adjudicating decisions under these
rules.  If potential vaccine developers are to invest in research, they must be confident that the
adjudicators will not abuse their power.  The credibility of a vaccine purchase commitment can
be enhanced by clearly specifying eligibility and pricing rules, insulating decision makers from
political pressure through long terms of service, and including former industry officials on the
adjudication committee.
Section 2 argues that requiring countries that receive vaccines to provide co-payments in
exchange for vaccines will give countries incentives to carefully investigate whether candidate
vaccines are appropriate for their local conditions.  Moreover, for any fixed level of donor
contributions, requiring co-payments gives potential vaccine developers greater incentives to
conduct research.Introduction 3
Section 3 outlines a possible process for determining vaccine eligibility and pricing.
Candidate vaccines would first have to meet some minimal technical requirements, which would
ordinarily include clearance by a regulatory agency, such as the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).  They would then be subject to a market test: Nations wishing to
purchase vaccines would need to provide a modest co-payment tied to their per capita income
and spend down an account assigned to them within the program.  Any vaccine meeting these
requirements would be eligible for purchase at some base price.  Vaccines exceeding these
minimum requirements could potentially receive bonus payments tied to vaccine effectiveness.
Section 4 discusses procedures if multiple vaccines are developed for a single disease.
The developer of the first vaccine against a disease creates enormous social benefits.  Developers
of subsequent vaccines create benefits only to the extent that their vaccines are superior or serve
populations that are not served by the first vaccine.  This suggests that rewards should be greatest
for the first vaccine developer.  The U.S. Orphan Drug Act specifies that the first developer has
market exclusivity unless a subsequent product is clinically superior.  This provision is generally
believed to account for the Act’s success in increasing research on orphan drugs.  An analogous
provision could grant market exclusivity for purchases under the program to the first vaccine
developed unless subsequent vaccines were clinically superior.
Section 5 discusses vaccine pricing and coverage.  Research and development on
vaccines is typically very expensive, but manufacturing additional doses is usually reasonably
cheap.  Given total revenue from a vaccine, research incentives are likely to be fairly similar if
few doses are sold at a high price, or many doses are sold at a lower price.  This suggests that it
is efficient to pay per immunized child, rather than per dose, and to include countries and
demographic groups in the program as long as vaccination is cost-effective at the incrementalIntroduction 4
cost of producing additional doses (rather than at the average price per person immunized paid
under the program.)  The total market promised by the program should be large enough to induce
substantial effort by vaccine developers, but less than the social value of the vaccine.  A rough
rule of thumb in the industry is that a $250 million annual market is needed to motivate
substantial research.  A program in which donors provide approximately $250 million in average
annual contributions and co-payments average another $86 million annually would cost
approximately $10 per year of life saved.  The World Bank has termed health interventions
costing less than $100 per year of life saved as highly cost effective [World Bank, 1993].
One way to avoid either paying more than necessary for a vaccine or offering too little to
stimulate research would be to offer a relatively modest price initially, and if this price proved
insufficient, to raise the promised price gradually until it proved sufficient to spur vaccine
development.  As long as the price did not increase at a rate substantially greater than the interest
rate, vaccine developers would not have incentives to withhold vaccines from the market in
hopes of obtaining a higher price.  It is unlikely that vaccines for all three diseases would be
developed simultaneously, but if donors wished to limit their potential liability, they could cap
their committed annual expenditure.
Section 6 discusses the appropriate scope of vaccine purchase commitments.  Should the
program be limited to vaccines, or also include drugs?  Which diseases should be covered?
The conclusion briefly considers the politics of programs to improve vaccine markets.  It
then discusses the proposed U.S. and World Bank programs and how a private foundation could
participate in a purchase commitment program.
This paper builds on earlier work.  The idea of an HIV Vaccine Purchase Program was
discussed in WHO [1996], and advocated by a coalition of organizations coordinated by theIntroduction 5
International Aids Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) at the 1997 Denver G8 summit.  Since then, the idea
has been explored by the World Bank AIDS Vaccine Task Force [World Bank, 1999, 2000].
Kremer and Sachs [1999] and Sachs [1999] have discussed such programs in the popular press.
This paper also draws on earlier work on vaccines, including Batson [1999], Dupuy and Freidel
[1990], Mercer Management Consulting [1998], and Milstien and Batson [1994], and on the
broader academic literature on research incentives, including Guell and Fischbaum [1995],
Johnston and Zeckhauser [1991], Lanjouw and Cockburn [1999], Lichtmann [1997], Russell
[1998], Scotchmer [1997], Shavell and van Ypserle [1998], and Wright [1983].
1. The Credibility of Vaccine Purchase Commitments
For a vaccine purchase commitment to be effective in spurring new research, potential
vaccine developers must believe that once they have sunk money into producing a vaccine, it
will be purchased at a price that covers their risk-adjusted costs of research, as well as their
manufacturing costs.  Sub-section 1.1 notes that courts have held similar commitments to be
legally binding contracts and argues that as long as the sponsor of a commitment has sufficient
funds to fulfill the commitment, physically moving money to a separate account is unnecessary
to provide legal commitment.  Sub-section 1.2 discusses some of the issues that would need to be
addressed in specifying eligibility and pricing rules based on technical characteristics of a
vaccine.  Sub-section 1.3 argues that some discretion will be needed to interpret how general
eligibility and pricing rules apply to any specific candidate vaccine, and discusses how the
credibility of adjudicating institutions could be enhanced.Section 1: The Credibility of Vaccine Purchase Commitments 6
1.1 Legal Doctrine
This section argues that a suitably designed commitment will be interpreted by the courts
as a legally binding contract, and that hence the key credibility issue will not be outright default
by the program sponsor, or whether money is physically set aside in a separate vaccine purchase
fund, but rather questions over the interpretation of program rules.
Courts have ruled that publicly advertised contests are legally binding contracts
[Morantz, 2000].  As summarized in Sullivan [1988], sponsors of contests are contractually
obligated to pay the winners according to their public announcements.  A contestant who
performs the requested act has formed a valid and binding contract with the promoter.  Attempts
to escape liability by changing contest rules after a contestant has accepted the offer by
performing the desired act are generally treated as breach of contract.  Advertisements with
certain specifications (identification of good, definite quantity of good, etc.) for the purchase of
goods at specified prices have also been found to be legally binding.  (See Vaccaro [1972] for a
summary and analysis of doctrine.)
Moreover, if the procedures in a contest stipulate who will judge the contest, decisions
made by the stipulated judge of the contest are usually treated as conclusive [Morantz, 2000].
The majority view among courts is that judges’ decisions are conclusive as long as they are made
in good faith, although some cases find that contracts giving one party the unilateral right to
decide disputes are unenforceable.  When the judge of the contest is an independent party, the
courts almost universally hold the decision as final unless the decision was made in bad faith, or
the judges exceeded the authority specified in contest rules.
1
                                               
1 The credibility of the vaccine purchase commitment can be increased by framing it as a unilateral contract (i.e.,
one not requiring a promise by others to become valid) and explicitly including a promise not to revoke.  SomeSection 1: The Credibility of Vaccine Purchase Commitments 7
There are a number of precedents for programs to reward developers of new
technologies.  The British government established a £20,000 prize for a method of determining
longitude at sea after a fleet got lost and struck rocks, drowning 2,000 sailors.  The prize was
won by John Harrison for the chronometer.
2  More recently, the Kremer prize for human-
powered flight led to the historic flight of the Gossamer Albatross across the English Channel
[Grosser, 1991].  The $30 million “golden carrot” contest for an energy efficient refrigerator
sponsored by 24 U.S. electric utilities offered to pay the winning team a certain amount for every
unit sold.  Whirlpool won the contest with a line of refrigerators that operated 70 percent more
efficiently than 1992 federal requirements.
Given that legally binding contracts can be written, physically setting aside funds in an
escrow account is not necessary for a commitment to be binding, as long as the sponsor of a
vaccine purchase commitment has sufficient funds to fulfill the commitment.  The key questions
for credibility revolve around specifying eligibility and pricing rules and procedures for
adjudicating disputes under these rules.
Depending on legal language, commitments could be made more or less binding.  The
options range from a simple announcement of an intention to purchase vaccines, to a legally
binding announcement with details on eligibility and pricing.  The more binding the
commitment, the stronger the incentives for potential vaccine developers.  In general, there is a
tradeoff between flexibility and credibly committing to pay for a vaccine.  Imperfect
commitment reduces both the expected revenue for vaccine developers and expected costs for
                                                                                                                                                      
additional legal issues might arise if a purchase commitment were made by a national government or an
international institution, and legal research would be needed to address these issues.
2 Sobel [1995] argues that the longitude prize committee was biased towards an astronomical solution and insisted
on improvements and multiple trials, creating repeated delays, until the king intervened on behalf of the
chronometer's inventor.  Note, however, that this account is disputed.  The economic historian Paul David argues
that the conditions imposed by the committee were reasonable [Personal communication, 2000].  In any case, this
points to the importance of program rules and adjudication procedures in influencing credibility of purchaseSection 1: The Credibility of Vaccine Purchase Commitments 8
the sponsor in the same proportion.  It reduces efficiency to the extent that the parties are risk
averse.
3
1.2 Issues to Consider in Determining Eligibility and Pricing
A program to increase the market for vaccines could offer to purchase vaccines meeting
certain technical specifications, offer to match money spent on vaccine purchases by other
institutions, or use some combination of these approaches.  For example, the Kremer prize laid
out detailed technical eligibility requirements.  The U.S. tax credit proposal does not specify
detailed technical requirements, other than FDA approval, but merely states that a 100 percent
tax credit will be given for sales of vaccines to non-profits and international institutions, which
would presumably make their own judgments as to whether candidate vaccines are acceptable.
The following are some of the key issues which would need to be considered in
determining vaccine eligibility and pricing based on technical specifications.
• vaccine efficacy—the reduction in disease incidence among those receiving the
vaccine.
4  Efficacy might vary in different circumstances.  A vaccine could
                                                                                                                                                      
commitments.
3 For example, consider a simple case in which potential vaccine developers seek to maximize expected profits and
accurately interpret the degree of commitment entered into by potential donors.  Suppose that in the absence of a
particular piece of contractual language in the vaccine purchase commitment, there is a 90 percent chance the
sponsor purchases the vaccine at the promised price and a 10 percent chance that they renege and renegotiate to a
price of half the level originally promised.  In this case, in the absence of a contractual arrangement, firms which
seek to maximize expected profits will act as if the value of the program is not the promised annual revenue from the
program, but rather 95 percent of the promised annual revenue.  Note that while the expected incentive is only 95
percent of the promised level, so is the expected cost to the sponsor.  To the extent that both vaccine developers and
the sponsor are risk-averse, they would both prefer a perfectly credible commitment of $950 million to a 90 percent
chance of $1 billion and a 10 percent chance of a $500 million payment.  In this sense, imperfect credibility reduces
the efficiency of purchase commitments.
4 Some have speculated about the possibility of an “altruistic” malaria vaccine, which would block further
transmission of the disease, without protecting the person who takes the vaccine.  It is unclear how many people
would be willing to take such a vaccine.  Moreover, given the high intensity of malaria transmission in many parts
of Africa, the epidemiological impact of an altruistic vaccine might be quite small unless the vaccination rate wasSection 1: The Credibility of Vaccine Purchase Commitments 9
potentially be more efficacious against some strains of the disease than others,
and thus be better suited to some geographic areas than others.  It could work for
some age groups, but not others.  A vaccine might prevent severe symptoms of
the disease, but not prevent milder cases.
• the number of doses required, the efficacy of the vaccine if an incomplete course
is given, and the ages at which doses must be taken.  If too many doses are
required, fewer people will bring their children in to receive the full course of
immunization.  If the vaccine can be given along with vaccines that are already
widely administered, delivery will be much cheaper.
• vaccine side effects.  Side effects could differ for different sub-populations.  Side
effects would also need to be considered for people who do not comply perfectly
with the delivery protocol.  For example, taking a partial course of a malaria
vaccine could potentially interfere with natural limited immunity.
•  the time over which the vaccine provides protection, and whether booster shots
could extend this period;
• what level of rigor would be required in the field trials.  For example, how long
would subjects have to be followed to determine the length of protection?  How
many separate studies in different regions would need to be conducted to assess
efficacy against different varieties of the disease?
• the extent to which vaccines would lose their effectiveness over time.
Presumably, some ongoing monitoring of vaccine effectiveness in the field would
                                                                                                                                                      
very high.  Committing in advance to purchase such a vaccine would be difficult.Section 1: The Credibility of Vaccine Purchase Commitments 10
be required, and if it appears that resistance to the vaccine is spreading, vaccine
purchases would have to be reassessed.
One possibility would be to design eligibility requirements based on rules using these
criteria in such a way that vaccines would be considered eligible if they met a cost-effectiveness
threshold.
5  Eligibility and pricing rules could potentially be set so that vaccines meeting a
certain cost-effectiveness threshold would be eligible for purchase and vaccines exceeding this
threshold would receive higher prices.
Note, however, that mis-specifying eligibility and pricing rules could misdirect research
incentives away from appropriate vaccines, or vitiate research incentives altogether.  For
example, if the program failed to specify otherwise, it might be obligated to purchase a malaria
vaccine that interfered with the development of natural immunity and provided only temporary
protection.  Such a vaccine might merely postpone malaria deaths.  If such a vaccine were
eligible for purchase under the program, researchers might pursue it, rather than devoting their
efforts to more useful lines of research.  On the other hand, there is a risk that the program could
set specifications so stringent that they would be difficult to achieve.  This would discourage
pharmaceutical firms from following promising leads.  For example, if the specifications
required 90 percent efficacy against all strains of the disease, potential vaccine developers might
not pursue a candidate vaccine that would be likely to yield 99 percent protection against most
strains, but only 85 percent protection against others.  If it were difficult to create a vaccine
delivering 90 percent protection in all regions, no vaccine at all might be developed.
Aside from specifying eligibility rules, the program would have to specify pricing rules.
Paying more for superior vaccines might create more appropriate incentives for researchers.  A
                                               
5 In future work, Rachel Glennerster and I plan to use the techniques in Appendix 2 to examine the cost-
effectiveness of vaccines with different degrees of efficacy, requiring different numbers of doses, and providingSection 1: The Credibility of Vaccine Purchase Commitments 11
90 percent efficacious vaccine is worth more than an 80 percent efficacious vaccine, and a
vaccine that requires no booster is worth more than one requiring boosters every five years.
1.3 Procedures to Increase Credibility of a Vaccine Purchase Commitment
General eligibility and pricing rules could be set out, but someone would have to exercise
discretion in interpreting these rules once vaccines have been developed and tested.
6  Once the
vaccine developer has sunk hundreds of millions of dollars in research, adjudicators might be
tempted to offer a price that covered only manufacturing costs or to insist on excessive product
testing and improvements.  If pharmaceutical executives suspect that the adjudicators will
succumb to these temptations, the companies will be reluctant to invest in a vaccine.
Credibility of vaccine purchase commitments to potential developers could be enhanced
by appointing appropriate decision makers (such as a committee with some members who have
worked in the pharmaceutical industry), insulating decision makers from political pressures
through long terms of service, establishing a minimum purchase price, and placing limits on the
discretion used by the program committee by laying out reasonably transparent rules for
determining eligibility and pricing.  Another way to enhance the credibility of a commitment is
to establish a program that covers a number of different diseases which primarily affect
                                                                                                                                                      
different lengths of protection.
6 Setting efficacy requirements for eligibility for an HIV vaccine is particularly difficult.  Because of the key
importance of a core group of high-risk people in influencing the spread of HIV, even a vaccine of low efficacy may
prove useful in disrupting the chain of transmission if it is targeted to this group.  On the other hand, at least
theoretically, an imperfectly effective HIV vaccine could increase the spread of HIV, since people might adopt
riskier behaviors if they felt they had reduced the chance of infection by taking an imperfect HIV vaccine.  This
outcome seems unlikely, however, since in steady state, an imperfectly effective vaccine could also potentially make
the highest activity people more hopeful about their chances of being uninfected, and therefore less likely to adopt
risky behavior.  Delivery of an HIV vaccine may have to use very different channels than delivery of existing
childhood vaccines, particularly if it is targeted to such a core group.  Little is known about the costs of reaching
such groups.Section 1: The Credibility of Vaccine Purchase Commitments 12
developing countries.  The program would then have an incentive to build up a reputation for fair
play.
7
The experience of central banks may offer some lessons for the design of a vaccine
purchase program.  Just as a vaccine purchase program would need to make a credible
commitment to purchase an effective vaccine if one were developed, central banks need to head
off inflationary expectations by credibly promising to take tough action if inflation starts to
increase.  Central banks insulate decision makers from political pressures by appointing them for
long terms, and a vaccine purchase program could do the same.  Appointing central bankers with
strong anti-inflation credentials also helps build credibility for central banks.  Similarly,
delegating decisions regarding eligibility and pricing to a committee which included some
members who had worked in industry might help convince potential vaccine developers that the
committee would not impose unreasonable conditions after they developed a vaccine.
8
Commitments by the vaccine purchase program will be more credible if the program
administrators have incentives to build a reputation for fulfilling promises.  If the program
covered vaccines against several diseases, program administrators would have incentives to
                                               
7 Note that the problem of inducing firms to conduct research and development on vaccines for which they expect
the government to be the major purchaser is in some ways similar to the problem of inducing firms to conduct
research and development on weapons for which they expect governments will be the major purchaser.  In each
case, the government must convince the firms contemplating undertaking research that it will not take advantage of
them by insisting on low prices once they have already sunk their investments in research.  Procurement rules for the
U.S. Department of Defense do not instruct procurement officers to purchase orders at the lowest possible price, but
instead to purchase at a price that covers suppliers’ costs.  The formulas used for calculating costs typically allow
firms to cover more than manufacturing costs, which in turn provides an incentive for firms to invest in research and
development to produce attractive products that allow them to win procurement contracts.  Rogerson [1994]
suggests that this serves as a reputational mechanism for encouraging research by defense contractors.  The Defense
Department has an advantage in that it is a long-standing institution, with a well-developed reputation about how it
treats contractors, and contractors can count on the desire of the Defense Department to maintain a reputation for the
future, because the continued existence of the Defense Department seems assured.  Unfortunately, the long-term
future of a vaccine purchase program is less certain.
8 Unfortunately, there is a history of antagonism between the pharmaceutical industry and existing international
vaccine purchasers such as the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the United Nations’ Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), which have a culture of trying to purchase vaccines at the minimum possible price.  These institutions,
therefore, might have difficulty administering a program designed to increase private-sector incentives for vaccine
development.Section 1: The Credibility of Vaccine Purchase Commitments 13
develop a reputation for treating vaccine developers fairly, so as to build credibility with
potential developers of other vaccines.
9  Nonetheless, it may take time to develop a reputation.
One way to help build credibility with potential vaccine developers would be to set a
minimum price in advance.
10  This could help solve the time-consistency problem, but at some
cost.  A vaccine which is useful, but not useful enough to warrant purchase at the minimum
guaranteed price, would not be purchased at all.  In practice, however, this problem may not be
that serious.  Most vaccines that passed regulatory approval would be cost-effective at even a
high price per person immunized relative to the likely availability of funds (See Appendix 2).
This is because vaccines falling far short of U.S. or European regulatory requirements have great
difficulty winning wide approval in developing countries in any case.
11  If one takes as given that
vaccines will only be used if they meet a stringent risk-benefit ratio, it seems quite unlikely that
guaranteeing a minimum price ex ante would lead to rejection of an otherwise usable vaccine on
cost-effectiveness grounds.  If a vaccine were not useful enough to warrant purchase at a few
dollars per person immunized, the cost of failing to purchase it would not be that great.
Moreover, if a vaccine turned out to be socially useful, but not good enough to qualify for
purchase under the program at the promised price, this would not preclude individual countries
from purchasing the vaccine or other donors from purchasing it.  The costs of guaranteeing a
minimum price seem small relative to the benefit of improving the credibility of commitments to
                                               
9 On the other hand, if the program maintained a single fund which could be used to purchase vaccines for any of
several different diseases, then potential vaccine developers might fear that once they had invested money in
developing a vaccine, the vaccine purchase program would try to pay a very low price for the vaccine, hoping to
save its resources to purchase vaccines for other diseases.  This problem could be addressed by maintaining separate
funds (or making separate financial commitments) for different diseases.
10 Setting low prices is the most likely way that the program could take advantage of vaccine developers.  Program
adjudicators concerned with public health will have limited incentives to insist on further trials, for example,
because they will presumably want to get an effective vaccine into the field.
11 This is illustrated vividly by the apparently meager prospects of the Wyeth-Ayerst rotavirus vaccine in developing
countries after it was withdrawn from the U.S. market following evidence that it causes intussusception in rare
cases.  The benefits of the vaccine are likely to outweigh by far its risks in developing countries, where rotavirusSection 1: The Credibility of Vaccine Purchase Commitments 14
reward vaccine developers, and thus spurring research.
                                                                                                                                                      
kills three-quarters of a million children each year.  Nonetheless, it appears unlikely that the vaccine will ever be
widely used.
2. Co-Payments
Another way to increase the market for vaccines would be to offer to match vaccine
purchases by others.  This is similar, in effect, to purchasing the vaccine and providing it to
others in exchange for a co-payment.  Requiring countries receiving vaccines to provide
reasonable co-payments can boost incentives for vaccine developers given any fixed level of
donor contributions.  Co-payments also help ensure that the authorities in recipient countries feel
that the vaccine is suitable for use in their circumstances.  This is important since conditions vary
among countries.  For example, a vaccine might be effective against the strains of malaria
prevalent in some countries, but not against other strains.  Finally, requiring co-payments is a
useful test of a country’s commitment to a program.  If a country is prepared to make a co-
payment, it is also more likely to be prepared to take the other steps necessary to ensure that the
vaccine is delivered to the people who need it.
Setting the level of co-payments involves a tradeoff between improving access once a
vaccine has been developed and creating incentives for vaccine development.  On the one hand,
once a vaccine has been developed, it will be produced at the efficient scale if the co-payment
equals the marginal cost of producing an additional dose.  On the other hand, given a fixed level
of donor contributions, incentives for vaccine development will be greater if developing
countries provide co-payments at their willingness to pay for the vaccine.Section 2: Co-Payments 15
Setting co-payments from countries receiving vaccines just below their estimated
willingness to pay for vaccines will maximize incentives for vaccine development while not
reducing consumption of vaccines below the optimal level.  Since richer countries are likely to
be willing to pay more for vaccines than poorer countries, this implies that co-payments should
rise with per capita income.
12  Willingness to pay may also be greater for diseases that create a
particularly high health burden, such as HIV/AIDS.  Given the uncertainty in estimating this
willingness to pay and the need for a uniform co-payment policy across heterogeneous countries,
it makes sense to estimate willingness to pay conservatively.  Insisting on too great a co-payment
would limit access to the vaccine, and, by reducing take-up, would reduce incentives for vaccine
developers.
Note also that setting the required co-payments close to countries’ willingness to pay
reduces vaccine developers’ temptation to try to extract supplemental payments from purchasing
countries.  It is not clear whether the vaccine purchase program should agree to be a party to
vaccine purchases with supplemental co-payments greater than those required under the
program, even if the recipient country agrees to this.  Allowing supplemental payments broadens
the scope for vaccine developers to demand prices greater than those offered under the vaccine
purchase program, and these higher prices could potentially exclude some countries from access
to vaccines.  For example, if the vaccine developer felt that most countries would be willing to
supplement the required co-payment by $1 a dose, it might demand this from every country.
Those countries unable to afford this supplemental payment would not be able to obtain the
vaccine.
Note that tying co-payments to income achieves many of the benefits of tiered pricing.  If
co-payments are set appropriately, access to vaccines is expanded so that vaccines can be used
wherever the social value of the vaccine exceeds the marginal production cost.  Incentives for
                                               
12 Willingness to pay is also likely to be higher for countries with a greater burden of disease, but requiring a larger
co-payment from countries with a greater disease burden seems inequitable and is likely to be politically infeasible.Section 2: Co-Payments 16
vaccine development can correspond to the aggregate willingness to pay for vaccines.  Yet
vaccine developers need not take the politically damaging step of revealing their willingness to
produce additional doses at low cost, thus risking generating enhanced political pressures for
price regulation.
3. Combining Technical Requirements and a Market Test
Technical eligibility requirements could potentially be combined with a market test.  For
example, candidate vaccines could first be required to meet basic technical requirements, which
would typically include clearance by some regulatory agency (such as the U.S. FDA).  They
could then be required to meet a market test—developing countries wishing to purchase vaccines
using program resources would be required to contribute a co-payment, and would be required to
draw down an account they would have within the vaccine purchase program.  Any vaccines
meeting these requirements would be eligible for purchase at some base price.  Vaccines
exceeding these requirements could potentially receive bonus payments linked to vaccine
effectiveness.  Ideally, this would make commitments to purchase useful vaccines at
remunerative prices credible to potential vaccine developers, but would leave enough flexibility
that appropriate purchasing decisions could be made after vaccines had been tested and their
characteristics became known.
3.1 Basic Technical Requirements
To be eligible for purchase, vaccines could be required to fulfill basic technical
requirements, which would normally include regulatory clearance by an established regulatorySection 3: Combining Technical Requirements and a Market Test 17
agency, such as the U.S. FDA or its European counterpart.  This would ensure that the funds
were spent for bona fide vaccines, rather than for quack remedies.  However, a vaccine may pass
a risk-benefit assessment in one country, but not another.  For example, a malaria or tuberculosis
vaccine with significant but small side effects might not be appropriate for general use in low-
prevalence countries, such as the United States, but might save millions of lives in high-
prevalence areas.
It might make sense to allow the program, at its discretion, to waive the requirement of
regulatory approval in donor countries if a country requested the vaccine and a scientific
committee established by the program concurred that the vaccine satisfied the risk-benefit
assessment given the situation in the applicant country.  More generally, it might be appropriate
to guarantee that any candidate vaccine satisfying certain high technical standards would receive
automatic approval to go on to the market test.  There could also be a gray area, in which
candidate vaccines could be approved at the discretion of a scientific committee.  This would
provide assurance to potential vaccine developers that if they develop a high-quality vaccine,
they will have a market.  It would also allow the committee the flexibility to consider purchasing
vaccines that passed a risk-benefit analysis, but fell short of an ideal vaccine.
Just as a vaccine might satisfy a risk-benefit assessment in a high-prevalence country, but
not in the United States, is possible that a vaccine could be appropriate in the United States, but
not elsewhere.  For example, a malaria vaccine that interfered with natural immunity might be
appropriate for U.S. travelers, who would not have built up this immunity in any case, but not for
long-term residents of malarious areas.  A few minimal technical requirements beyond
regulatory approval are therefore likely to be appropriate before vaccines were made eligible for
the market test described below.  Travelers’ vaccines for malaria, which protect people makingSection 3: Combining Technical Requirements and a Market Test 18
short trips, would presumably be ineligible.
13  Other technical requirements might include a
requirement that a vaccine could only be purchased for a country if it had been shown effective
for the strains of disease prevalent in that country.  Vaccines requiring more than some cutoff
number of doses to be effective might require a special waiver for eligibility.  Some ongoing
monitoring might be required, to ensure that resistance to the vaccine had not developed and
spread.  However, the credibility of purchase commitments with potential vaccine developers
would be enhanced by keeping technical eligibility requirements beyond regulatory clearance
minimal and clearly defined to reduce the potential for abuse of discretion.  This would
decentralize the basic purchasing decision to individual recipient countries.  Of course, these
countries would be free to consider recommendations put out by the World Health Organization
or any other body.
3.2 The Market Test
As discussed above, vaccines could meet regulatory approval, but still be unsuitable for
widespread use in a particular developing country.  For example, a vaccine that was effective
only if people received ten precisely timed doses might be useful for the U.S. military, but not
for most people in developing countries.  Requiring vaccines which satisfy the technical criteria
to meet a market test would allow purchasers the flexibility to make decisions about whether a
particular vaccine is appropriate for their needs.  In particular, developing countries would have
incentives to seriously consider the suitability of candidate vaccines if they had to provide a co-
                                               
13 It might therefore, for example, be appropriate to specify that the program could require proof of efficacy over
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payment and draw down an account within the vaccine purchase program that would be
established specifically for each country.
Co-payments help ensure that after a particular vaccine has been tested, it is considered
worth purchasing.  However, co-payments alone may not be sufficient to demonstrate country
commitment, since donors might offer to help fund co-payments.  It is not clear that it would be
possible or desirable to prohibit this.
Countries could be further motivated to carefully consider their purchases by establishing
sub-accounts within the program for each country.  If a country decided to purchase a vaccine, it
would draw down the commitments allocated to it.  This system would give countries an
incentive to purchase a vaccine only if they were confident that it could be effectively
administered in their country and if they did not expect a superior vaccine to come on the market
shortly.  Otherwise, they would be better off saving the funds in their sub-account.
In the absence of separate sub-accounts, countries might agree to purchase even
marginally effective vaccines, knowing that if they did not consume the available funds, other
countries would.  If potential vaccine developers anticipated this, they might invest in a
candidate vaccine that looked like it would meet only minimal eligibility requirements, rather
than investing in a slightly more risky, but ultimately much more promising, vaccine.  If
countries must spend funds earmarked for their own vaccine purchases, they will have more
incentive to purchase only high-quality vaccines, thus providing incentives for potential vaccine
developers to focus on developing such vaccines.  Since countries would not be able to use their
accounts to purchase anything but vaccines, and would not receive interest on their accounts ifSection 3: Combining Technical Requirements and a Market Test 20
they remained unspent, they would have every incentive to use their accounts to purchase a good
vaccine if one were available.
14
Relying only on a market test and eliminating any technical requirements could
potentially lead to the purchase of inappropriate vaccines due to bribery or tied deals.  Vaccine
developers could offer to kick back some percentage of the purchase price to the developing
country in the form of price reductions on other pharmaceuticals, or even bribes.  This could
potentially be an attractive arrangement for the developing country or its officials, since the
country itself would contribute only a co-payment towards the cost of the vaccine, with the bulk
of the financing coming from the vaccine purchase program.
A series of safeguards are therefore needed to prevent purchase of inappropriate vaccines
due to bribery or tied deals.  The technical requirements for eligibility provide the first and most
important line of defense.  This would prevent a country from using program funds to purchase a
quack vaccine manufactured by a politically-connected firm.  Outright corruption could probably
be limited with provisions punishing firms found guilty of bribing officials and restricting the
amount of travel, training, and other perks that vaccine sellers could provide to health ministry
officials.  Under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, firms and executives found guilty of
bribing foreign governments are subject to criminal prosecution.  Other nations are now adopting
similar laws.  Since the developing-country vaccine market is a small part of overall business for
most large pharmaceutical companies, they would likely be reluctant to risk bad publicity, the
attention of regulators, and legal sanction in order to make some extra money on vaccines.
                                               
14 If interest were paid on accounts, countries would be under less time pressure to reach agreement with vaccine
developers, and therefore might have such a strong bargaining position that they could prevent vaccine developers
from recovering their research costs.  Note that vaccine developers are automatically under time pressure to reach a
deal with purchasers, because their patent is time-limited.  Moreover, if interest is not paid on individual country
accounts, then any interest accumulated on the program could be used to fund grants for basic vaccine research, or
allocated to countries where disease prevalence had increased since the program was established.Section 3: Combining Technical Requirements and a Market Test 21
Whistle-blower procedures could be instituted to protect, or even reward, committee
members reporting attempts at bribery by vaccine developers.  Similarly, vaccine developers
could blow the whistle on committee members who tried to insist on kickbacks.  Members of the
committee who were proven to have asked for kickbacks could be removed from the committees.
Implicit tied dealings are more difficult to regulate.  A pharmaceutical firm
simultaneously negotiating with a health ministry over a malaria vaccine and an antibiotic might
convey to the ministry that it would be willing to be flexible on the antibiotic price if the ministry
would purchase the malaria vaccine.  In the absence of further incentives, vaccine developers
might therefore aim only at creating a vaccine that could pass minimal eligibility requirements,
rather than a more widely useful vaccine.
15
One way to limit corruption and tied deals, while still preserving a market test, would be
to include civil society as well as governments in countries’ decision-making processes.  For
example, the committee making purchase decisions for a country might include not only
representatives of the Ministry of Health, but also respected physicians, non-governmental
organization representatives, and scientists.  Countries wishing to participate in the program
could be required to set up such committees in advance, and members could have security of
tenure.  Some members of the committee could be appointed by the vaccine purchase program.
The committee could have authority to release resources from the country’s sub-account within
the program.  The government would need to authorize disbursements of public funds to cover
co-payments, but donors could potentially fund co-payments.
                                               
15 Payments by third parties are also difficult to regulate.  Suppose a Swiss firm invents a malaria vaccine which is
not effective against the strains of malaria prevalent in some country, and therefore is not appropriate for that
country.  The government of Switzerland or a foundation supported by the firm could provide aid for purchasers to
use towards their co-payments.  With a 20 percent co-payment, this would allow the government of Switzerland or
the foundation to spend one dollar to raise five dollars for the company.Section 3: Combining Technical Requirements and a Market Test 22
Limiting the number of doses purchased for any one country would limit the potential
loss from tied deals and corruption.  The number of doses purchased for a country might be
limited to the number needed for the annual birth cohort, with some adjustment for the initial
years of the program when a backlog of unimmunized people would need to be vaccinated.
3.3 Bonus Payments Based on Vaccine Quality
Specifying a minimum price which would be paid for vaccines meeting the first two steps
– technical requirements and the market test -- would help provide potential developers with a
credible commitment.  However, it would be desirable for developers to have incentives to
develop vaccines that exceed a minimum eligibility threshold.  It might therefore be useful to
provide bonus payments depending on vaccine quality.  One standard way to measure cost-
effectiveness in health is the cost of saving a Disability-Adjusted Life Year, or DALY.  DALYs
take into account not only the years of life lost but also the years of disability caused by a
disease.  In order to create appropriate incentives for vaccine developers to develop high-quality
vaccines, bonus payments could be set so as to tie the reward to the number of lives or DALYs
saved and to the cost of delivery.
Bonuses could be provided for vaccines believed to exceed a cost-effectiveness threshold,
in dollars spent per DALY averted.  If a vaccine exceeded this threshold, some fraction of the
resulting savings could be returned to the vaccine developer as a bonus above the base price.
Basing incentives on lives or DALYs saved would create good incentives for
pharmaceutical firms to develop vaccines that create positive externalities, such as a malaria
vaccine with an altruistic component which kills gametocytes, and thus prevents other peopleSection 3: Combining Technical Requirements and a Market Test 23
from becoming infected.  Any side effects of a vaccine could be subtracted from the measure of
lives or DALYs saved.
16
Bonuses could also be paid if the vaccine was cheap to deliver.  This would create
incentives for researchers to develop vaccines that are oral, rather than injectable, that do not
require many doses, and that can be delivered along with the vaccines currently given as part of
the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI).
Bonus payments could potentially be set in two ways.  A committee could be free to base
bonus payments directly on its estimates of the number of lives or DALYs saved by a particular
vaccine, using any data it wished.
17  Alternatively, a schedule of bonus payments could be set in
advance as a function of more easily measured vaccine characteristics, such as efficacy in
clinical trials, the number of doses needed, etc.  The approach used in Appendix 2 could be
extended to estimate the set of vaccine characteristics associated with any particular cost-
effectiveness threshold.
Directly estimating DALYs or lives saved after vaccines are developed allows the
program to consider a broad range of vaccine characteristics and to use up-to-date information,
                                               
16 It is worth noting that currently, the medical profession and society as a whole seem to weight DALYs caused by
side effects much more heavily than DALYs saved.
17 Information about the number of lives or DALYs saved might become available only gradually, and therefore, if
this approach were adopted, it might theoretically be best to condition payments on long-run outcomes.  For
example, it might initially be unclear whether a vaccine provides protection only temporarily, or indefinitely.  The
extent to which a vaccine prevents secondary infections might also be difficult to predict in advance.  Initial bonus
payments to vaccine developers could be based on conservative estimates of lives or DALYs saved and additional
payments could be made later, depending on the realization of lives or DALYs saved.  Of course, if payments were
delayed, accumulated interest would have to be paid as well.  Basing bonus payments to vaccine developers on
realized DALYs or lives saved, rather than on the results of the clinical trials required for regulatory approval,
creates better incentives to develop vaccines that will work in the real world, rather than only in clinical trials, where
it is easier to make sure that delivery protocols are followed exactly. Moreover, if bonus payments could be claimed
after a vaccine had already been used, it would be much more difficult for a price-setting committee within the
vaccine purchase program to refuse to pay a remunerative price.  Before a vaccine is used in the field, the committee
could argue that it deserves only a small bonus, citing potential problems with the vaccine.  However, if the vaccine
is used, and it reduces the burden of malaria by 90 percent, it will be very hard for the committee to argue that it is
ineffective.  (Exceptions to this are new diseases, such as HIV, for which predictions of prevalence in the absence of
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but it also creates more uncertainty for vaccine developers and raises the prospect of bias by the
committee charged with estimating DALYs and costs.
18  The appropriate strategy depends in part
on how trustworthy the committee charged with these tasks is considered to be, and in part on
what reasonably transparent and objective procedures can be developed for measuring vaccine
efficacy.  Thus, it may vary among diseases.
19
Basing payments directly on the number of lives or DALYs saved through a vaccine, and
the cost of delivery, is also potentially problematic because these quantities depend not only on
actions under the control of the vaccine developer, but also on actions by others.  To the extent
that health ministries cannot easily maintain cold chains or deliver vaccines to rural areas on a
precise schedule, vaccinations that require cold chains and precisely timed deliveries will be
expensive per life or DALY saved.
If the weaknesses of health ministries are not strategically aimed at extracting payments
from the vaccine developer, this will create appropriate incentives for vaccine developers.
Vaccine developers should try to design vaccines that are appropriate for actual health systems,
not for some theoretical ideal health system.  For example, if health ministries cannot maintain
cold chains for vaccines, then vaccine developers should have incentives to develop heat stable
vaccines.
However, to the extent that health ministries behave strategically, it will be best to base
bonus payments on preset indicators of the likely number of DALYs saved, rather than the actual
number of DALYs.  This is because if vaccine developers were paid based on realized DALYs
                                               
18 Basing incentives on mortality rather than DALYs might be attractive, since mortality is easier for the public to
understand and perhaps less subjective and open to manipulation.  On the other hand, it may be best to more closely
tie incentives to objectives by rewarding DALYs saved.  It is desirable to give researchers incentives to reduce
morbidity as well as mortality, and to guard against side effects that cause morbidity.
19 For example, in Africa, HIV prevalence can be taken as a good indicator of future HIV deaths and disability, but
prevalence of malaria may be a poor indicator of the total burden of malaria, since a vaccine might greatly reduce
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saved, health ministries could potentially try to extract payments from the vaccine developer in
exchange for agreeing to distribute the vaccine efficiently.  This would weaken incentives for
vaccine development.
If the committee charged with estimating lives or DALYs saved simply makes honest
mistakes in calculating these quantities, but those mistakes do not systematically tend to
underestimate or overestimate the actual effects of the vaccine, then the potential profit from
developing a vaccine could as easily be increased or decreased by the uncertainty in calculations
of DALYs or lives saved.  The attractiveness of investment in vaccines would be reduced, but
only to the extent that vaccine developers are not willing to take gambles that could turn out to
help them as easily as to hurt them.
Errors in estimation of DALYs or lives saved are particularly problematic if vaccine
developers can influence these estimates through actions other than research.  For example, if
politically-connected pharmaceutical firms obtain more favorable DALY calculations, firms will
divert effort towards developing political connections and away from developing good vaccines.
The scope for bias would be reduced by setting forth procedures as fully as possible
ahead of time, working under a framework of establishing a bonus per life or DALY saved.  The
World Health Organization project on the burden of disease has developed detailed procedures
for estimating DALY burdens.  Epidemiological surveys could be conducted to assess the burden
of various diseases prior to the development of vaccines.
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Sunset provisions could be incorporated into a vaccine purchase program.  For example,
a malaria vaccine fund could revert to the donors or be used for other health problems in
developing countries if, after fifty years, no qualifying vaccine had been developed, or if at some
earlier time, a scientific committee established by the program determined that the burden of
malaria had been sustainably cut more than 50 percent through other techniques, such as
insecticides.  Sunset provisions could be continuous, so that the purchase commitment would fall
with the severity of the disease.  Note that any bonus payment based on DALYs or lives saved
would automatically fall with prevalence of the disease.  A sunset provision would increase the
risk borne by potential vaccine developers, but biotech and pharmaceutical firms routinely have
to bear the risk that alternative technologies will render the projects they are working on
superfluous.  There is no reason why this should be any different for firms working on
developing country diseases.  It is efficient for researchers to consider the possibility that their
work will be superseded by other technologies when choosing their research projects.
4. Procedures for Multiple Vaccines
For vaccine purchase commitments to spur research, it is essential that intellectual
property rights be respected.  If the program purchases vaccines from imitators, rather than
respecting the intellectual property rights of the original developers, incentives for vaccine
development will be vitiated.
20
                                               
20 If the vaccine purchase program were an international organization, it is not clear what court would have authority
to rule on intellectual property rights questions.  One option would be to spend funds from each donor in accordance
with the intellectual property rights laws of that country.  For example, U.S. funds would not be used to purchase
vaccines that violate U.S. patents.Section 4: Procedures for Multiple Vaccines 27
However, enforcing patents may not be enough.  Once one vaccine for a disease has been
developed, it becomes easier for competitors to develop alternative vaccines, even if the first is
protected by a patent, as it can be relatively easy to design around vaccine patents.  Developers
of the initial vaccine, therefore, face a risk that a marginally superior vaccine will be produced
shortly after the initial vaccine is developed and that this subsequent vaccine will capture the
entire market.  This risk may deter research.  In many industries, first-mover advantages due to
network effect or to brand loyalty by customers are as important as patents in protecting
innovations, but since governments are the main purchasers of vaccines, and are less likely to be
influenced by brand loyalty, other forms of protection may be needed for vaccine developers.
It will be important to preserve rewards for the initial developer, who will have made the
largest investment in research.  Currently, the world needs acceptable vaccines for malaria,
tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS, and incentives for a private developer are a small fraction of the
social value.  Once an adequate vaccine is developed, however, the world’s need for a second
vaccine will be much more limited.  This suggests a smaller reward will be needed to bring
private incentives for a second vaccine into line with the social value of a second vaccine.  To
some extent, the initial developer will receive a larger share of vaccine purchases in any case,
since the initial developer will sell vaccines used to immunize the backlog of unimmunized
adults, while subsequent developers will be restricted to the market of new cohorts of children.
Pricing a vaccine in nominal terms will also disproportionately help the original developer, since
real prices will fall over time.  (It would even be possible to specify a falling time path of
nominal prices.)
The developer of the first vaccine could be further protected through an exclusivity
clause similar to that in the Orphan Drug Act.  This would require that the initial vaccine beSection 4: Procedures for Multiple Vaccines 28
purchased if newer alternatives were not clinically superior.  This provision is widely believed to
have greatly increased research on orphan drugs [Shulman and Manocchia, 1997].
In practice, the exception for “clinically superior” vaccines may not weaken incentives
for the first developer that much, since regulatory standards for approval of the first vaccine are
likely to be high, and it may be difficult to show that a subsequent vaccine is “clinically
superior.”
Note that market exclusivity would apply only to the target population for which the
original vaccine was adequate.  Thus, for example, if one firm develops an AIDS vaccine
effective against a particular clade of the disease, it would have marketing exclusivity for that
clade, but not for other clades.
One potential objection to the market exclusivity provision is that it could increase the
risk borne by developers.  In the absence of a market exclusivity clause, if several firms develop
vaccines around the same time, they will share the market.  Providing market exclusivity to the
first vaccine developer could potentially increase risk.  On the other hand, to the extent that
prices fall if multiple vaccines are invented, or firms dissipate potential profits in marketing
expenditures, the expected reward to investing in vaccine research and development is greater
with a market exclusivity clause.  The success of the Orphan Drug Act in increasing research and
development on orphan drugs suggests that the increase in expected profits is the key issue for
potential developers.  If it were thought important to avoid increasing the risk borne by potential
vaccine developers, purchases under the program could be limited to those vaccines invented
within some period (perhaps a year or two) following the licensing of the first acceptable
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engaged in a tight race to develop a vaccine, while also reducing the chance that “me too”
vaccines would greatly reduce sales for the initial developer and thus deter research.
The exception in the Orphan Drug Act’s market exclusivity provision for clinically
superior products could potentially be modified for application to a vaccine purchase
commitment.  Ideally, if a subsequent vaccine were clinically superior, the price paid would be
related to the marginal improvement the subsequent vaccine represents over the original vaccine,
and the original vaccine developers would continue to receive compensation in line with the
social value of their work.  A bonus payment system provides a potential mechanism for doing
this.  One option would be to retain the exclusivity clause even if a superior vaccine were
developed, but give the developer of the original vaccine incentives to buy out the technology of
the second producer.  The bonus payments that would go with supplying a superior vaccine
would provide such an incentive.  Alternatively, the newer vaccine could be purchased at a price
based on its efficacy, but the developer of the newer vaccine could then be required to pay the
original developer an amount equal to the price paid for the original vaccine, less an allowance
related to the production cost of the new vaccine.  While this approach matches private and
social research incentives more closely than the blanket exception for superior products in the
Orphan Drug Act, it would be difficult to administer.
5. Vaccine Coverage and Pricing
This section first argues that the key determinant of research incentives will be the total
revenue generated by a vaccine, rather than the price per person immunized.  Decisions about
where it is cost-effective to vaccinate should be based on the incremental cost of manufacturingSection 5: Vaccine Pricing 30
an additional unit of vaccine, rather than the average price paid per person immunized under the
program.  Given the desired market size and number of required vaccinations, the price per
person immunized can be determined by dividing the desired market size by the number of
people needing immunization.  The tricky question is determining the appropriate market size.
The total market promised should be large enough to stimulate research, but not so large that a
vaccine purchase program would not be cost-effective.  Sub-sections 5.2 and 5.3 note that a
rough rule of thumb in the industry is that a market of $250 million per year is necessary to spur
significant research, and argue that a vaccine purchase program would be highly cost effective
even at a substantially larger scale.  The sponsor of a vaccine purchase commitment could start
with a modest program, which would not be too expensive, but retain the option to increase the
value of the program if the original program proved too small to stimulate sufficient research.
Sub-section 5.4 argues that as long as the vaccine price is not expected to increase too quickly,
this will not lead vaccine developers to withhold a vaccine from the market in the hope of getting
a better price.
5.1 Coverage
The key determinant of research incentives will be the total discounted revenue generated
by a vaccine.  It is very expensive to conduct research, but once research is complete, it is
typically fairly cheap to produce additional doses.  For a fixed amount of total revenue, vaccine
developers will therefore be almost as happy to produce a high volume at a low price as a low
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This implies that, at least as a first approximation, prices should be set per person
immunized, not per dose.  There is little reason to pay more per person immunized if more doses
are required to provide immunity than if a single dose is required.  In fact, the vaccine is more
valuable if only a single dose is required to provide immunity, as this reduces delivery costs and
is likely to increase patient compliance.
Moreover, the vaccine purchase program would not save money by excluding large
countries from coverage, or excluding countries if vaccination is cost-effective at the marginal
cost of production, but not at the average price paid for vaccine under the program.  This is a
false economy, because potential vaccine developers will need a fixed amount of revenue to
induce them to conduct research, and if fewer doses are purchased, the price per person
immunized will need to be greater to induce the same amount of research.
21
Given the quantity of vaccines likely to be needed, the price per immunized person
should be set so as to yield the desired market size.  Market size should be large enough to
stimulate research if scientifically warranted, but not so large that a vaccine would not be cost
effective.
5.2 What Size Market Is Needed to Spur Research?
There is no single answer to the question of how large a market is needed to spur
research.  The larger the market for a vaccine, the more firms will enter the field, the more
research leads each firm will pursue, and the faster a vaccine will be developed.  The more
researchers entering the field, the smaller the chance that any particular firm will be the first to
                                               
21 Excluding countries that would have bought vaccine in the absence of a program at prices greater than or equal to
the price paid by the program would, however, increase incentives to develop vaccines.  A sliding scale of co-Section 5: Vaccine Pricing 32
develop a vaccine.  Thus the cost of development, adjusted by the risk that a particular firm or
research team will not win the development race, rises with the potential size of the market.
Given the enormous burden of malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS, it is important to provide
sufficient incentive for many researchers to enter the field and to induce major pharmaceutical
firms to pursue several potential leads simultaneously so that vaccines can be developed quickly.
 Because potential vaccine developers know that their research may fail, in order to have
incentives to conduct this work, they must expect to more than cover their research expenses if
they succeed.  For example, if potential biotechnology investors expect that a candidate vaccine
has a 1 in 10 chance of succeeding, they would require at least a tenfold return on their
investment in the case of success to make the investment worthwhile.
22
There are several ways to get a sense of the minimum market size needed to motivate
investors.  DiMasi et al [1991], who examined 93 randomly selected new chemical entities from
a survey of twelve pharmaceutical firms and found that, taking into account the risk of failure at
each stage in the drug development process, the average cost per approved New Chemical Entity
(NCE) was $114 million 1987 dollars.  Capitalizing this to the date of marketing approval at a
(probably over-generous) 8 percent discount rate implies an average cost of $214 million 1987
dollars, or approximately $313 million 1999 dollars.  While this figure is of some interest, there
is wide variation in the cost of developing pharmaceuticals.  DiMasi found that for most stages in
the vaccine development process, the standard deviation of cost was greater than the mean cost.
                                                                                                                                                      
payments could be used to gradually phase out the program.
22 As discussed in the companion paper, advocates for grant-funded research programs may have incentives to be
over-optimistic about the prospects for easily developing vaccines.  The Institute of Medicine estimated in 1986 that
a malaria vaccine could be developed for $35 million.  This estimate is far too low.  From the limited description of
their methodology, it seems that their cost estimate assumes success in every stage of the vaccine development
process, while in fact, it is likely that many different candidate vaccines will have to be tried before a usable vaccine
is developed.  A further indication that the Institute of Medicine’s estimates were over-optimistic lies in their 1986
prediction that a malaria vaccine could be licensed within 5 to 10 years.Section 5: Vaccine Pricing 33
Vaccine trials for diseases with low incidence, such as HIV and tuberculosis, require very large
samples, and are therefore expensive.
23
The cost of developing malaria, tuberculosis, or HIV vaccines may be much higher than
suggested by these estimates, since surveys of existing drugs and vaccines are disproportionately
likely to focus on the low-hanging fruit of entities that are cheap to develop.  Unfortunately,
vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV may not be such low-hanging fruit.
It is also useful to consider the revenue streams which seem sufficient to induce vaccine
research in developed countries.  The new Varivax vaccine against chickenpox is expected to
average about $177 million in annual revenue for the first 7 years of its sales [Merck Annual
Report, 1998].
One approach to estimating the necessary size of a program is to ask pharmaceutical
executives whether a vaccine purchase program could serve as an important incentive for
research, and how big the program would need to be do so.  There are several reasons why this
approach may give misleading results.  First, the question is mis-specified.  As discussed above,
firms must decide not merely whether to invest in developing a particular vaccine, but also at
what level to invest.  The more lucrative a market, the more leads they will pursue.  Second,
pharmaceutical executives may see the question as part of a price negotiation, and may therefore
inflate their estimates, particularly if they expect that budgets are likely to be cut in a process of
negotiation.  Third, pharmaceutical firms may well request programs that increase their profits,
without necessarily increasing their incentives to develop a new vaccine.  In particular,
pharmaceutical executives may claim that the most useful motivator for HIV vaccine research
would be higher prices on existing vaccines.  Pharmaceutical executives clearly have an
                                               
23 Regulators may require large samples even for vaccines for diseases with higher incidence, because they believe it
is especially important to detect potential side effects of vaccines, since they are administered to healthy people.Section 5: Vaccine Pricing 34
incentive to claim this, whether or not it is the case.  Fourth, pharmaceutical firms have been
criticized for failing to invest in research on vaccines for diseases which kill millions of people,
while investing in more commercially viable drugs [Silverstein, 1999].  This may make
executives reluctant to admit that they are not investing in vaccines because they think such
vaccines would not be profitable.  It is more politically acceptable for executives to say that they
are not investing because they see few scientific prospects for such a vaccine.  Finally, the key
decision makers are not just pharmaceutical firms, but also biotech firms and their potential
investors.  Scientists working on vaccines may not have even considered the possibility of
starting biotech firms or seeking investors, but if a large market were expected for vaccines, they
might start thinking about this.  Given that they probably have not spent that much time thinking
about these issues yet, their responses to questions may not be that informative.
The opinion of outsiders, familiar with the industry, but not part of it, may be somewhat
more credible.  A respected pharmaceutical consulting firm estimates that a $250 million annual
market is needed to motivate pharmaceutical firms [Whitehead, 1999].  A ten-year purchase
commitment would likely be sufficient to motivate research, given that potential vaccine
developers are likely to heavily discount sales after this period, and that competing vaccines are
likely to emerge after ten years in any case, and drive down prices to the point at which they
could be more broadly affordable.
24  A condition of participation in the program could be
agreement to license the vaccines to producers in developing countries after ten years of
purchases at an appropriate level.
                                               
24 The life of a patent is 20 years.  However, a vaccine would only reach the market several years after the date of
application for a patent.  The effective life of a patent is the number of years of remaining on the patent from the
time that it is first brought to market.  Shulman, DiMasi, and Kaitin [1999] report that the average effective patent
life for new drugs and biologicals is 11.2 years under the Waxman-Hatch Act, which granted extra protection to
inventors to partially make up for loss of patent life during regulatory review.  Without the Act, patent life would be
8.2 years.  The Act covers the U.S. only, and there is no reason to believe that developing countries will offer similar
patent protection.  As noted above, a requirement to license vaccines after ten years could potentially be built intoSection 5: Vaccine Pricing 35
If politicians are unwilling to assume liability for more than a fixed amount of potential
expenditure, coverage under the program could be capped.  For example, suppose that a $250
million annual market was deemed necessary to spur serious research on each vaccine, but that
political leaders were unwilling to commit to more than $520 million in potential annual
expenditures on new vaccines.  Suppose also that the chance that malaria, HIV, and tuberculosis
vaccines were all developed simultaneously were judged to be less than 10 percent.  Instead of
only covering vaccines for two diseases, an alternative approach would be to pledge $260
million in annual purchases for vaccines for any of the diseases, subject to a $520 million cap on
total committed annual expenditures.  In the unlikely case that vaccines for three diseases were
developed simultaneously, purchases for each would average one-third of $520 million, or $173
million.  The expected market for a vaccine developer would be 0.9 * $260 million + 0.1 * $173
million, or $251.3 million.
5.3 Cost-Effectiveness
While the need to motivate research sets a lower bound on the size of the purchase
commitment, the need for the program to be cost-effective when compared to alternative health
interventions sets an upper bound on the size of a purchase commitment.  This section argues
that given the level of funding which is likely to be forthcoming, this is unlikely to prove a
serious constraint.  The World Bank calls health interventions that cost less than $100/DALY
saved highly cost effective [World Bank, 1993].  A program to purchase vaccines for malaria,
tuberculosis, and HIV would be one of the most cost-effective health interventions in the world.
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Appendix 2 contains preliminary estimates of the cost-effectiveness of commitments to
purchase vaccines at various funding levels, vaccine efficacy levels, and required numbers of
doses.
The base case we examine is based on an 80 percent effective one-dose vaccine and an
average annual market of $336 million for each vaccine.  Donors would contribute
approximately $250 million annually, co-payments providing the remainder.  The net present
value of expenditures per discounted DALY saved over a ten-year horizon would be $18 for
malaria, $33 for tuberculosis, and $10 for AIDS.  However, the benefits of the program will
continue beyond the 10-year life of the purchase commitment as competing vaccines appear and
prices fall.  With competition the price of the vaccine is likely to fall to a level which is
affordable for governments and agencies such as UNICEF.  The NPV of expenditures per
discounted DALY saved over an infinite horizon would be $9 for malaria, $21 for tuberculosis,
and $5 for AIDS.  Overall, the coast would be about $10/DALY. The cost-effectiveness may be
underestimated, as these calculations do not take into account the likely reduction in secondary
infections due to vaccinations.  The vaccine price per person immunized in the first 10 years
would be $5.38 for malaria, $2.03 for tuberculosis, and $3.43 for HIV.
As discussed in Appendix 2, purchase commitments would remain cost-effective under a
range of alternate assumptions about vaccine efficacy, the number of vaccine doses required, and
the size of the fund.
5.4 Increasing the Promised Vaccine Price over Time
The sponsor of a vaccine purchase commitment program could start with a relatively
modest program.  If additional incentives were judged necessary to spur vaccine research, theSection 5: Vaccine Pricing 37
promised price could be increased until a vaccine were developed or the price reached the social
value of a vaccine.
25  This procedure mimics auctions, which are typically efficient procurement
mechanisms in situations in which production costs are unknown.
26
As long as the price promised for a vaccine does not increase at a rate greater than the
interest rate, firms will not have an incentive to sit on a vaccine they have developed while
waiting for the price to rise.  To see this, note that a firm which delays selling a vaccine
postpones its returns into the future, and therefore has to discount these returns at the interest
rate.  In addition, delay risks the possibility that a competitor will introduce an alternative
vaccine.  Finally, if the vaccine developer has already taken out a patent, delay uses up the patent
life.
If the price promised to vaccine developers was increased, this increase could potentially
be restricted to vaccines which were based on patents that had not yet been taken out.  Greater
incentives may not be needed to stimulate the final stages of research on a candidate vaccine that
is already promising.  Moreover, restricting price increases to vaccines based on new patents
reduces the chance that firms will withhold a product from the market in the hope that prices will
increase.  Pharmaceutical firms are not likely to risk delaying patent applications for fear that a
competitor will preempt them, especially since there are potentially many competing biotech
firms that could patent vaccines, whereas only a few large pharmaceutical firms actually conduct
clinical trials and manufacture vaccines.
27   As discussed in Appendix 1, increasing the price over
                                               
25 Since the quantity purchased would stay constant, total revenue would rise in proportion to price.
26 Another option would be to pre-announce that if no vaccine had been developed by a certain date, the price would
start growing automatically.  However, it is probably better to let future decision makers choose whether or not to
increase the price, since in some scenarios it would be optimal not to increase the price.  For example, there would
be no need to increase the price if general technological advances in biology reduced the expected cost of
developing a vaccine sufficiently that many firms decided to pursue vaccines.
27 One potential problem with this approach is that vaccine developers might incorporate unnecessary late-patented
components in the vaccine to qualify for a higher price.  However, a committee could rule on what were the key
patents used in a given vaccine, so simply adding an extra useless patent would not lead to a higher vaccine price.Section 5: Vaccine Pricing 38
time may induce firms to delay starting research on a vaccine, or slow down the pace of this
research, but this strategic delay will not be severe if many firms can potentially compete to
develop a vaccine.  Moreover, while vaccine trials could not be conducted secretly, research
towards patents could be, and this would make it much more difficult for potential vaccine
developers to collude to increase the price by delay.
Appendix 1 uses techniques from the economic theory of auctions to examine the effect
of increases in price on vaccine development.  The main results are as follows: If there are many
competing firms, a system in which the price starts low and rises over time will generate a
vaccine at close to the lowest possible cost.  The fewer competing researchers, the longer each
waits before beginning vaccine research.  The greater the initial price, the more rapidly a vaccine
will be developed.  This implies that if society values a vaccine highly, it should choose a high
initial price, and thus be willing to incur the risk of paying more than the minimum cost
necessary to spur vaccine development.  In the most realistic case, increasing the growth rate of
the price will speed vaccine development unless very few firms could potentially compete to
develop the vaccine.
6. The Scope of a Purchase Commitment
Potentially, advance purchase commitments could be used to encourage research not only
on vaccines, but also on other techniques for fighting disease, including drugs, diagnostic
devices, and insecticides against the mosquitoes which transmit malaria.
Covering a range of technologies would avoid biasing research effort towards vaccines,
rather than other technologies to fight disease.  The example of the British government’s prize
for a method of determining longitude suggests that prize terms should be set so as to admit aSection 6: The Scope of a Program 39
variety of solutions.  Most of the scientific community believed that longitude could best be
determined through astronomical observations, whereas the actual solution was through
development of a sufficiently accurate clock.  Pre-specifying an astronomical solution would
have been a mistake.
On the other hand, opening up the program to any method of fighting disease would
make defining eligibility and pricing decisions almost impossible.  For example, developers of
new HIV counseling techniques could seek to obtain payments for new techniques for promoting
safe sex.  Resources would be wasted in disputes over the impact of such programs.  If only
vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV were eligible, the resources wasted on administration
and on attempts to influence the committee would likely be fairly small relative to the cost of
developing a vaccine, since only those who had actually developed a vaccine would have an
entry ticket to begin trying to influence the disposition of program funds.  One factor that
militates toward restricting the program to vaccines and drugs is that existing institutions, such as
the U.S. FDA, already have a reputation for adjudicating safety and efficacy of vaccines and
drugs.  A safe, environmentally appropriate insecticide might be an excellent way to fight
malaria, but a whole set of procedures would need to be developed to determine eligibility
standards for insecticides.  This suggests that research on insecticide might be better supported
through push programs.
In principle, purchase commitments are appropriate for both drugs and vaccines, but if a
choice has to be made for budgetary reasons, vaccines are probably a slightly higher priority,
since distortions in vaccine markets are more severe.  Since drugs are much more susceptible
than vaccines to the spread of resistance, individual decisions to take drugs may potentially
create negative, as well as positive, externalities.  Moreover, drugs are widely considered to beSection 6: The Scope of a Program 40
more profitable than vaccines, perhaps because consumers are reluctant to spend on vaccines for
either behavioral or learning reasons.
Table 1 shows the number of deaths caused annually by various diseases for which
vaccines are needed.  Given a sufficient budget, it might be appropriate to commit in advance to
purchase vaccines developed against any of these diseases.  However, if funding is tightly
limited, it may be appropriate to target the most deadly diseases.

















Chagas disease 17 0.20
Dengue 15 0.18
Leprosy 2 0.02
Total deaths 8319 100.00
a Estimated, World Health Report, WHO, 1999
b A pneumococcus vaccine was just approved for use in the United States, but it needs to be
tested in developing countries, and perhaps modified accordingly.
c The Jordan Report, NIAID, 1998
d R. Bergquist, WHO, personal communication
Source: Children’s Vaccine Initiative, CVI Forum 18, July 1999, p. 6.
An alternative option would be to start with some easier-to-develop vaccines and drugs as a way
of building credibility.  It also may be useful to first experiment with purchase commitments for
a few vaccines or drugs and then consider modifying or extending the program based on the
resulting experience.Section 6: The Scope of a Program 41
Conclusion
For a vaccine purchase commitment to stimulate research investment, it must provide a
credible promise that developers of good vaccines will be rewarded.  Eligibility requirements
could include both minimal technical standards, and the market test that developing countries be
willing to provide a co-payment for the vaccine.  To provide incentives for development of high-
quality vaccines, bonus payments for vaccines could be tied, directly or indirectly, to the number
of lives or DALYs saved by the vaccine, and to the delivery cost.  The developer of the first
viable vaccine could have market exclusivity unless subsequent vaccines are clinically superior.
The vaccine price promised per immunized child could initially be set at a modest level, and
could then be raised if it proved insufficient to spur enough research.
This conclusion briefly discusses the politics surrounding vaccine purchase programs.  It
then discusses the proposed U.S. tax credit for qualifying vaccine sales and the proposed World
Bank $1 billion fund for purchasing vaccines for future diseases.  Finally, it discusses how a
private foundation could implement a vaccine purchase commitment.
The Politics of Creating Markets for Vaccines
Those with a stake in current aid programs and in grant-funded research programs may
object to pull programs designed to create markets for vaccines, if they fear that resources would
be drawn from important existing initiatives.  Organizations involved in efforts to encourage
condom use, for example, may fear that funds to develop an AIDS vaccine would be drawn fromConclusion 42
prevention efforts.  Academic and government scientists working on HIV research may be
concerned that a vaccine purchase program may result in cuts in other important research
programs.  These groups are well placed to affect the political decision-making process.
Conflict between the need for incentives to develop new vaccines and existing prevention
and research efforts will be limited if a purchase commitment is financed from pledges rather
than current budgets.  When a vaccine became available, it might be seen as justifying increasing
the total aid budget.  Alternatively, once a vaccine became available, some existing prevention
efforts may be less cost-effective, and budget savings will be possible.  The prospect of these
future cuts will be politically easier than cutting existing programs, as future aid budgets do not
have as much constituency among aid workers as current aid budgets.  The people currently
promoting condom use or researching HIV may have retired or gone on to other jobs by the time
an HIV vaccine has been developed.  It is worth noting that the budgetary conflict between
research on new vaccines and efforts to control disease using existing technologies is sharper if
research is financed out of current budgets, as it would be in push programs, than if it is financed
through future vaccine purchases, which would come out of future budgets.
At least in the U.S. Congress, pharmaceutical firms are also likely to be a key player in
discussions of how to encourage vaccine research and development.  Pharmaceutical firms will
be interested in seeing some expenditure early in the program.  This may be in part because such
expenditures would enhance the credibility of the commitment, and in part because a program
rewarding, say, a malaria vaccine, would not necessarily yield high expected profits, since much
of the profit would be dissipated in competition to develop the vaccine.  It may be easier to find
champions for such programs in the pharmaceutical industry if some portion of the funds can be
used to cover vaccines which are closer to development.  In particular, several newConclusion 43
pneumococcus vaccines are expected to be developed soon.  Additional work will be needed to
test the suitability of these vaccines for developing countries, and perhaps to modify them to
reflect the strains of pneumococcus prevalent there.  As currently written, the U.S.
administration’s proposal would cover new pneumococcus vaccines, since the disease kills more
than a million people each year.  Note, however, that one vaccine for pneumococcus has been
licensed recently, and that under the administration’s proposal, this particular vaccine would not
be eligible, since it was developed before the legislation was passed.
Potential Sponsors of New Markets for Vaccines
Commitments to purchase vaccines could be undertaken by governments of industrialized
countries, the World Bank, or private foundations.  One institution could establish the basic
infrastructure for a program and make an initial pledge and other organizations could later make
pledges of their own.  The initial pledge could cover particular diseases or countries, with later
pledges broadening the program.  Nations might not want to pledge to a vaccine purchase
commitment program operated under another donor nation’s control, so it might make sense to
build in procedures for representation of multiple donors on decision-making bodies at the start,
even if the program were initially supported by only one or two donors.
The U.S. administration’s budget proposal
[http://www.treas.gov/taxpolicy/library/grnbk00.pdf] includes $1 billion in tax credits on vaccine
sales over the 2002-2010 period.  The program would match every dollar of qualifying vaccine
sales with a dollar of tax credit, effectively doubling the incentive to develop vaccines for
neglected diseases.  Qualifying vaccines would have to cover infectious diseases which kill atConclusion 44
least one million people each year, would have to be FDA approved, and would have to be
certified by the Secretary of the Treasury after advice from the U.S. Agency for International
Development.  To qualify for the tax credit, sales would have to be made to approved purchasing
institutions, such as UNICEF.  Although the President’s proposal is structured as a tax credit, it
would have effects similar to an expenditure program that matched private funds spent on
vaccines.  The administration’s proposal could help catalyze other funds for vaccine purchases,
since it matches such purchases dollar for dollar.
The details of which vaccine sales would qualify would be worked out by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) under the program, and the analysis in this
paper suggests that the details of their procedures will be quite important for the effect of the
program.  Biotech and pharmaceutical firms are more likely to find the commitment credible if,
once the tax credit legislation is passed, USAID quickly specifies guidelines for how it will
allocate credits.  In particular, USAID would need to specify how it will address issues of
vaccine pricing (presumably, it would not approve credit allocations for a small quantity of
vaccine sold at tens of thousands of dollars per person immunized), how much of the fund could
be spent on a vaccine that is currently far along in research, such as the pneumococcus vaccine;
and what procedures would be used to allocate credits if multiple versions of a vaccine were
available.
The World Bank president, James Wolfensohn, recently said that the institution plans to
create a $1 billion loan fund to help countries purchase specified vaccines if and when they are
developed [Financial Times, 2000].  Glennerster and Kremer [2000] discuss this proposal in
more detail.  Details of the Bank program have not been announced.  One option under
consideration is a more general program to combat communicable diseases of the poor.  For aConclusion 45
general program to stimulate research, it must include an explicit commitment to help finance the
purchase of new vaccines if and when they are developed.  Without an explicit commitment
along the lines proposed by Wolfensohn, it is unlikely that the large-scale investments needed to
develop vaccines will be undertaken.  As discussed in the companion paper, increased coverage
of existing vaccines, while desirable in its own right, will by itself be inadequate to convince
potential vaccine developers that there will be a market for new vaccines when they are
developed, given the long lead times for vaccines and the fickleness of donor interest.
An explicit commitment to help finance purchases of new vaccines will not interfere with
other initiatives to tackle communicable diseases of the poor.  This is because the commitment
does not have to be financed unless and until a vaccine is developed.  So, for example, the Bank
could increase lending to promote the use of bednets against malaria, or increase coverage of
existing vaccines, while committing that if and when new vaccines are developed, it will provide
loans to countries purchasing these vaccines.
Some within the Bank have traditionally regarded earmarking future credits for a
particular purpose as undesirable because it reduces the flexibility of the Bank to provide loans
where they would achieve the greatest benefit.  Sacrificing flexibility is a mistake when it brings
no compensating advantage.  However, earmarking may be justifiable as a response to time-
consistency problems.  In particular, in the case of vaccines, earmarking can help resolve the
time-consistency problem inherent in convincing potential vaccine developers that governments
will compensate them adequately once they have sunk funds into developing vaccines.  The loss
of flexibility associated with earmarking does not seem like a major problem, since it would be
hard to imagine a situation in which purchasing vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis, and AIDS
would not be cost-effective.  In any case, a commitment could be structured so that it would beConclusion 46
triggered only if a vaccine satisfied a particular cost-effectiveness threshold.
For countries to have an incentive to participate in the proposed World Bank program,
loans will need to be at the concessional International Development Association (IDA) rates, and
must not simply substitute for other concessional loans countries would have received.  This is
because commitments by one country to purchase vaccines benefit other countries by
encouraging vaccine research and development.  No one country, therefore, has a sufficient
incentive to make a commitment on its own (the global public good problem.)
Private foundations could also play a major role in creating markets for new vaccines.
Foundations may find it easier than governments to credibly commit to future vaccine purchases,
given their greater continuity of leadership.  In particular, the Gates Foundation has $22 billion
in assets, and one of its main priorities is children’s health in developing countries, and vaccines
in particular.  U.S. law requires private foundations to spend at least 5 percent of their assets
annually.  This suggests that a way that “push” and “pull” incentives for vaccine development
could be combined.  A U.S. foundation could spend 5 percent of its assets annually on grants to
help expand use of existing vaccines and provide for vaccine research.  Meanwhile, the
foundation could put its principal to use in encouraging vaccine research, simply by pledging
that if a vaccine were actually developed, the foundation would purchase and distribute it in
developing countries.Appendix 1: The Effect of Increasing the Promised Price for Vaccines 47
Appendix 1: The Effect of Increasing the Promised Price for Vaccines
This appendix analyzes the effects of increasing the price pledged for a vaccine under the
simplest model of auctions, in which each firm has a private cost of developing a vaccine, and
these costs are independent.  Suppose that the cost of developing a vaccine for pharmaceutical
firm i, denoted ci, is independently drawn from a distribution F with upper support p  and that
there are N symmetrical pharmaceutical firms.  Suppose the price p starts at some value p < p
and then grows, or is expected on average to grow, at a constant rate until a vaccine is invented,
or until p reaches p.
An equilibrium consists of a function pi(ci) mapping each firm’s cost into a price at which
it will develop a vaccine.  A necessary first-order condition for pi(ci) to be privately optimal is
that the growth rate of surplus, pi-ci, must equal the discount rate plus the hazard rate that a rival
firm will develop the vaccine.  In the simplest case, in which bidders are symmetric and the cost
of developing a vaccine is not correlated among bidders, pi increases monotonically with ci.
Given monotonicity, the hazard rate that a rival will enter depends on the probability that a rival
firm has a cost slightly greater than ci conditional on no firm having a cost less than ci.  As the
number of firms grows, pi(ci) declines, asymptotically approaching ci, and the hazard rate that a
rival enters grows without bound.  Thus, if there were many symmetric pharmaceutical firms,
this auction mechanism would lead a vaccine to be developed at a price very close to the cost of
its development.  Increasing the number of bidders not only reduces the expected price, but also
reduces the expected time until a vaccine is developed given F and the growth rate of p.
At least over some range, increasing the growth rate of p, taking p as fixed, will speed the
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that the faster the growth rate of p, or equivalently the lower the discount rate, the greater pi(ci).
To see why increasing the growth rate of p speeds the auction, note that if the growth rate of p is
infinite, then the auction concludes immediately because the price immediately attains its upper
limit of p .  As the growth rate of p approaches zero, the expected time for the auction to
conclude grows without bound.  Moreover, reducing the growth rate of p must asymptotically
increase the time until a vaccine is developed, since as p & /p approaches zero, pi(ci) approaches its
lower bound of ci, and hence as the growth rate slows, the reduction in pi is bounded, whereas the
time it takes for the auction to reach any particular price increases without bound as the auction
slows.
It seems likely that the expected time until a vaccine is produced typically declines with
the growth rate of p, given p, but if there are few firms, it is possible to construct examples in
which the expected time until a vaccine is produced increases with the growth rate of p.  If there
are many firms, then pi(ci) will be very close to ci, and hence reducing the growth rate of p will
have little effect on pi(ci), but will still lengthen the time required to reach any price.  Hence,
with many firms, a rapidly growing price, given p, is likely to lead to a much faster vaccine
discovery.  On the other hand, if there are only a small number of firms, then pi(ci) may be
significantly greater than ci, and reducing pi(ci) may significantly shorten the auction.  Consider
the extreme case with only one firm.  If p grows rapidly enough, the bidder will prefer to wait
until the end of the auction, when the price reaches p , before developing a vaccine.  On the
other hand, if the growth rate of the price is less than the interest rate, then once p/ci is great
enough, the vaccine will be developed.  Thus, at least for some realizations of ci, increases in the
growth rate of p can lengthen the time until a vaccine is developed.  If the distribution of the cost
of development is such that most of the mass is at a low level, but there is a thin tail reaching upAppendix 1: The Effect of Increasing the Promised Price for Vaccines 49
to p , then increases in the growth rate of p can lengthen the expected time until a vaccine is
developed.
Holding constant p and the growth rate of the price, the higher p, the shorter the time
until a vaccine is developed.  This suggests that the more a vaccine is valued, the greater p
should be.  In the extreme, if the social value of the vaccine is far greater than the upper support
of c, then it would make sense to either have the price rise very quickly, or to choose p close to
p.  Some may feel that the social value of vaccines is so great that it is better to spend more
money than to risk delay, but this does not seem to be the revealed preference of rich country
governments.
As long as the price does not grow that much faster than the interest rate, pharmaceutical
firms will not actually sit on a vaccine they had already developed, waiting for the price to rise.
Given discounting, it would be better for the firm to wait to begin research, rather than to first
incur the cost of developing a vaccine, and then sit on the vaccine.  Even if the firm got lucky
and developed a vaccine faster than it expected, it would not sit on it if the growth rate of the
program were equal to or less than the discount rate.  Once a vaccine is developed, the
opportunity cost of losing out to another bidder is not p-ci, but rather p.  The firm would only
wait to develop the vaccine if the growth rate of p exceeded the discount rate plus the hazard rate
that another firm would develop a vaccine.
28
The optimal initial price depends on the expected cost of developing the vaccine, and
therefore would generically differ between diseases.  To see this, consider a hypothetical
example in which each pharmaceutical firm faces its own cost of developing a vaccine, but it is
common knowledge that the cost of developing a malaria vaccine is such that research would be
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profitable at between $5 and $6 per person immunized, while the cost of developing an HIV
vaccine is such that research would be profitable at between $15 and $16 per person immunized.
Starting the auction at more than $6 per person immunized would provide unnecessary rents to
developers of a malaria vaccine.  Starting the auction at less than $15 per person immunized
would unnecessarily delay the development of an HIV vaccine.
The analysis above treats the cost of developing a vaccine as independently distributed
across bidders, but in practice, there are almost certainly common components to this cost, and to
the benefits of selling a vaccine to the program.  This will create some tendency towards a
winner’s curse.  Firms might try to publicize any leads in research in order to deter rivals.  This
is a general feature of patent races, and is not specific to this mechanism.  Since developing a
vaccine involves many stages of research, and promising vaccines can fail at any stage from
laboratory tests to animal trials to Phase 4 human trials, potential rivals are unlikely to believe
that the leader has a lock on becoming the first to develop a vaccine.
29
                                                                                                                                                      
reward.
29 For example, rotavirus vaccine was recently withdrawn from the U.S. market, at least temporarily, following
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Appendix 2: Preliminary and Rough Cost-Effectiveness Estimates
Rachel Glennerster
30 and Michael Kremer
This appendix reports some preliminary attempts at a rough estimate of the cost-
effectiveness of a program to purchase vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV.  It considers
a variety of funding levels for the program, efficacy levels for the vaccines, required number of
doses, and coverage rates but focuses on a base case of a program providing an annual market
averaging $336 million per year for 10 years for purchases of each vaccine, of which donors
would provide approximately $250 million annually, and co-payments would cover the
remainder.  Our base case assumes that the vaccines will be 80 percent effective and require only
a single dose to provide a lifetime of protection.  Preliminary estimates suggest that the cost per
Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY) saved, including the cost of co-payments, would be $9
for malaria, $21 for tuberculosis and $5 for AIDS.  (A DALY is a standard measure of the
burden of disease which takes into account not only the years of life lost but the years of
disability caused by a disease.  The World Bank termed health interventions costing less than
$100 per DALY as highly cost effective [World Bank, 1993].)  We then note that these estimates
are likely to be conservative.
Below we discuss our assumptions about the DALYs saved by vaccines, manufacturing
and delivery costs, coverage, and the share of costs covered through co-payments.  We then
present results on the number of doses delivered and program cost-effectiveness.  Tables A1 and
A2 summarize our assumptions and results.  Table A3 shows sensitivity of the results to
alternative assumptions of funding levels for the program, efficacy levels for the vaccines,
                                               
30 Rachel Glennerster wrote this while a visiting scholar at the Harvard Center for International Development.  She
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required number of doses, and coverage rates.  Table A4 shows the cost per DALY saved in the
base case relative to a counterfactual in which vaccines were not developed until fifteen years
later.  Further details of the calculations, including spreadsheets used in the analysis, are
available from the authors.  These spreadsheets can be used to examine the robustness of the
analysis to alternative assumptions.
DALYs Saved
The DALYs potentially saved as a result of the program are estimated using data on
disease burden from the World Health Report [WHO, 1999].  This source estimates the DALY
burden of various diseases in regions such as Africa and the Americas.
31  Geographic
heterogeneity in burden of disease will lead us to underestimate the scope for targeting vaccine
delivery, and thus the cost-effectiveness of a vaccine.  (To see the logic in an extreme case, note
that if a disease is spread evenly throughout a country, it is necessary to vaccinate everyone to
protect the population, whereas if it is concentrated in one region, it may be possible to protect
the population by immunizing only people in that area.)  We have made very rough attempts to
disaggregate the burden to individual countries within regions using data from World Health
Organization [1998] for tuberculosis, UNAIDS [2000] for HIV/AIDS, and Gallup and Sachs
                                                                                                                                                      
those of the Executive Board or other members of the IMF staff.
31 WHO provides information on the DALY burden of disease, which is calculated under the assumption that people
would face a very favorable (Japanese) life expectancy in the absence of the disease.  The DALY burden will, in
general, be greater than the number of DALYs saved by eliminating the diseases, because the diseases affect
countries where people face many other competing risks.  This would bias estimated cost-effectiveness upward.  To
correct for this, we use the rough and ready approximation that the benefit of eliminating a disease in a country
equals the burden of disease times the ratio of the present discounted value of a stream of benefits received over the
expected lifespan in the country to the present discounted value of a stream of benefits received over the expected
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[2000] for malaria.
32  Within each country we allocate the burden to different age groups using
the same proportions as in Murray and Lopez [1996]. We follow Murray and Lopez in applying
a 3 percent real discount rate.
Our base case assumes that vaccines will have 80 percent efficacy.  Most current
vaccines have close to 100 percent efficacy, but newer vaccines may be less effective. We have
not taken into account the DALYs saved from reductions in secondary infections. This effect is
likely to be small for malaria, which has such a high reproductive rate in some parts of Africa
that the chain of transmission is unlikely to be significantly disrupted by vaccination programs
with realistic coverage rates.  Studies have shown that even a dramatic reduction in the number
of infected mosquitoes have little impact on the prevalence of the disease [Loutan et al].  For
tuberculosis and HIV, many more secondary infections may be prevented, but the number is
extremely difficult to estimate.
Manufacturing and Delivery Costs
Manufacturing costs for most vaccines are quite low, although newer vaccines may well
be more expensive to produce.  Given that the package of five vaccines in the Expanded Program
on Immunization (EPI) schedule sells for $0.50 per dose, and that vaccines would be purchased
                                               
32 For tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, these sources give number of infections by country, and we allocate the DALY
burden in the same proportion.  For malaria, Gallup and Sachs report only qualitative levels of prevalence.
Percentages of the population living in low- and high-risk areas are reported for each country.  Based on these
probabilities and data on incidence of malaria in limited countries, we gave a weight of 1 to low-risk and 10 to high-
risk areas and weighted according to the population living in low- and high-risk regions.  For example, if 20 percent
of the population live in low-risk areas, 50 percent live in high-risk areas, and 30 percent live in areas without
malaria, the estimated proportion of burden for the country is (1 x 0.2 x 100) + (10 x 0.5 x 100).  The regional
DALYs were then allocated to individual countries in proportion to these proportion of burden numbers.  Although
the calculation is very rough, it affects only the distribution of burden among countries, not overall burden.Appendix 2: Preliminary and Rough Cost-Effectiveness Estimates 54
in bulk under the program, it seems reasonable to assume that manufacturing costs would be
$0.50 per immunization.
Our base case is that of a vaccine requiring a single dose which could be added to the
standard package of vaccines that are delivered under the EPI package.  The package, which
includes 3 contacts with each child, costs $15, or $5 for every contact [World Bank, 1993]. The
majority of this cost is delivery cost as the price of the EPI vaccines is very low.  We assume that
the additional delivery cost of adding one additional vaccine to the package will not exceed
$1.00. This seems safe given that the World Bank estimated that adding two new vaccines to the
EPI package would increase the cost of the package by 15 percent, or $2.25, including both the
purchase price and the delivery cost [World Bank, 1993].  Manufacturing and delivery costs are
assumed to be constant in real terms over time. We assume that coverage of new cohorts of
children will be the same as for the EPI package (i.e., that three-quarters of each new cohort of
children will be immunized).
Delivering a vaccine to older children and adults will be more expensive since a delivery
system is not already in place.  It is likely to be relatively cheaper to vaccinate those who are
already gathered in one place, such as school children and pregnant women attending pre-natal
clinics.  Reaching other groups is likely to be more expensive.
The delivery cost is also likely to rise with the percentage of the population which is
targeted, as some people, such as those who live in cities and regularly use the health care
system, will be easy to reach, while others, who live in remote areas and are unwilling to come to
clinics, will be difficult to reach.  We have assumed that 30 percent of the population aged 1-35
will be immunized against tuberculosis and AIDS in the first year. After the first year, only new
cohorts will be immunized against these diseases.  The delivery cost for reaching 30 percent ofAppendix 2: Preliminary and Rough Cost-Effectiveness Estimates 55
children aged 1-10 is assumed to be $3, while the delivery cost for reaching 30 percent of people
aged 11-35 is assumed to be $5, the average cost of a contact with the EPI program.
33  Note that
actual delivery costs might be much lower, as 30 percent of adults may well seek vaccination on
their own.
We assume a malaria vaccine would be targeted to children under 5 and to first-time
mothers, the two groups for which the disease is most often fatal.
34  Clinics already exist which
provide medical services to pregnant women in many developing countries. We therefore assume
that 50 percent of women pregnant with their first child will be immunized against malaria each
year for the first 20 years at a cost of $3 per woman.   After this, most first-time mothers will
have already been immunized as children.  We have assumed that ¼ of births are to first-time
mothers.  We also assume that 50 percent of one to five year olds are vaccinated against malaria.
For HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, we assume that 30 percent of the stock of unimmunized 11 to
35 year olds, and 75 percent of children in new cohorts will be vaccinated.
Co-Payments
We assume co-payments per immunized person of 0.25 percent of per capita Gross
National Product (GNP) for HIV/AIDS, 0.06 percent of per capita GNP for tuberculosis, and
0.16 percent of per capita GNP for malaria.  (These percentages are chosen to be proportional to
the DALY benefits of each vaccine per person immunized, since willingness to pay presumably
increases with DALY benefits per person vaccinated.)  For concreteness, this implies that for a
                                               
33 Under our assumptions, it is cost effective to vaccinate newborns against HIV/AIDS rather than to wait until they
become older, even though this means delivery costs must be incurred sooner, because it is much cheaper to
immunize people as part of the EPI program.
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low-income country, such as Kenya, with GNP per capita of $340, the co-payment would be
$0.83, $0.19, and $0.56 per immunization for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, respectively.
Results
Number of Vaccinations
As discussed in section 5.1, once a vaccine has been developed, it should be used
wherever it is cost effective given manufacturing and delivery costs.  Using the assumptions
above on the DALY burden of disease and costs of vaccine manufacturing and delivery, we
calculate the marginal cost per DALY of vaccination for each of the three different age groups in
each country.  Vaccination is assumed to be cost effective if the marginal cost of delivery and
manufacturing is less than $100 for every DALY saved.  For example, sixty-four countries have
high enough malaria burden that immunization of new cohorts would be cost effective.
Widespread immunization of new cohorts would be cost effective in 112 countries for
tuberculosis, and in 75 countries for HIV.
Overall, we find that in the first 10 years of the program, it would be cost effective to
vaccinate 625 million people against malaria, 1,656 million people against tuberculosis, and 980
million people against HIV (Table A2).
Purchase Cost, Co-Payments, and Cost-Effectiveness
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Given an average annual market of $336 million for each disease, and the number of
immunizations projected above, the price per immunization would be $5.38 for malaria, $2.03
for tuberculosis, and $3.43 for AIDS.  The total value of co-payments over 10 years would be
$0.6 billion for malaria, $0.7 billion for tuberculosis, and $1.3 billion for AIDS.  As a larger
number of people are assumed to be immunized in the first year than in subsequent years, the
payment to the developer will be front loaded.
After the 10 years of the program we assume that competing vaccines will be developed,
and prices will fall.  With competition, we assume that the vaccines can be purchased by
governments or UNICEF at a price equal to the manufacturing cost, which is assumed to be
$0.50 per immunization. For net present value calculations we use a nominal discount rate of 5
percent and a real discount rate of 3 percent.
The net present value (NPV) of purchase and delivery costs, over 10 years, would be $3.5
billion for malaria, $6.8 billion for tuberculosis and $4.3 billion for HIV.  The program would be
highly cost effective even in the short run, with a NPV cost per discounted DALY saved over the
first 10 years of $18 for malaria, $33 for tuberculosis, and $10 for HIV.  However, the benefits of
the program will continue beyond 10 years.  The NPV cost per discounted DALY saved over an
infinite horizon would be $9 for malaria, $21 for tuberculosis, and $5 for HIV.  Overall, the cost
per DALY saved would average $10.
Sensitivity Analysis
Estimating DALY burdens and assessing the marginal cost of vaccination involves many
difficult judgments, and it would be a mistake to attach even a moderate degree of precision toAppendix 2: Preliminary and Rough Cost-Effectiveness Estimates 58
these estimates.  Yet even if the calculations of the program cost per DALY saved were off by a
factor of 5 for tuberculosis or a factor of 18 for HIV/AIDS, they would still meet the World
Bank’s cost-effectiveness criteria of $100/DALY.
The program remains highly cost effective under a variety of sensitivity checks.  Table
A3 shows that the program would be highly cost effective even if vaccine efficacy were only 30
percent.  (The tuberculosis vaccine does become considerably less cost effective, but still easily
passes the $100/DALY cost-effectiveness threshold.)  Note that as the efficacy of a vaccine
declines, the number of people for whom vaccinations are cost effective at a threshold of
$100/DALY declines.
Panel 2 of Table A3 shows that changing the cost-effectiveness threshold at which people
are vaccinated has only a minor impact on the discounted cost of the program per DALY saved,
and that the number of people vaccinated does not fall dramatically if the cost-effectiveness
threshold is set at $50/DALY rather than $100/DALY.
Panel 3 shows that increasing the required number of doses significantly raises program
costs, given our assumptions.  This is because delivery costs are a large portion of overall
program costs.  However, even if a vaccine requires three doses, the program would remain
highly cost effective.
35
The fourth panel shows how the cost-effectiveness of the program varies with the size of
the market promised to vaccine developers.  Doubling the size of the market promised to vaccine
developers increases the cost per DALY by considerably less than a factor of two.  This is
because delivery costs represent a large share of overall costs, and they are unaffected by
increasing the price paid to vaccine developers.
                                               
35 Note, however, that we have not adjusted for the lower compliance rates to be expected when more doses are
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Panel 5 shows the effect of changing the discount rate used.  Most cost-effectiveness
analyses of health programs assume a 3 percent discount rate, and to maintain consistency with
this literature, we also assume a 3 percent discount rate.  However, the program would still be
highly cost effective at a 5 percent discount rate.
The final panel shows scenarios with different vaccination rates. The first line shows the
base case with 75% of new cohorts, 50% of pregnant women and school children, and 30% of
other targeted existing cohorts vaccinated.  The second line shows a vaccination rate of
approximately 2/3 the base case, with 50% of new cohorts, 35% of school children and pregnant
women, and 20% of other existing cohorts reached.
The base case analysis above implicitly assumes that vaccines would not be developed in
the absence of a program.  One can also consider the case in which vaccines would eventually be
developed in the absence of a program, but they would take longer to be developed.  Given the
extremely small incentives for vaccine development now, the long lead times, great risk, and
high expense involved in vaccine testing and licensing, it seems likely that in the absence of a
concerted program, vaccines would not be available for a long time.  We consider the case in
which the introduction of a vaccine would be delayed by fifteen years in the absence of an
incentive program.  Note also that under current institutions, new vaccines may take ten or
twenty years after they are introduced to achieve wide use in poor countries, because they are
initially priced at high levels, and many developing countries cannot afford them.  We will
assume that in the absence of a program, countries with per capita incomes below $500 could not
afford vaccines for the first ten years after the vaccines were introduced.
The first row of Table A4 shows the cost per DALY saved of the program relative to a
counterfactual in which a vaccine was developed fifteen years later which sold for $2 per doseAppendix 2: Preliminary and Rough Cost-Effectiveness Estimates 60
and had the same country coverage as under the program. The second row shows the cost per
DALY saved under the program relative to an alternative in which vaccines were developed
fifteen years later, sold for $2 per dose, and did not reach countries with incomes under $500 per
capita until an additional ten years had passed.  The latter case seems more realistic, given
experience with previous vaccines.
        These estimates are likely to be conservative, as we have not taken into account some important
but hard to quantify effects.  1) As noted above, immunization programs are likely to reduce
secondary infections, particularly for HIV and tuberculosis.  2) We have assumed that the
population and prevalence of the diseases are at steady state.  Given the fixed costs of research
and development, population growth will tend to reduce the price per immunization and the cost-
effectiveness of the program.  3) HIV prevalence is growing rapidly, which would lower the cost
of the program per DALY saved.  4) It is possible that with widespread immunization, the
diseases would be eradicated, at least in some regions.  In this case the benefits of the program
would continue while the delivery and manufacturing costs would fall.  5) We have neglected
benefits flowing to rich countries, which are important for HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.  6) We
have assumed reasonably high manufacturing and delivery costs.  7) We have not allowed for
any targeting of vaccine delivery to areas of particularly high prevalence within countries, which
would improve cost-effectiveness.Appendix 2: Preliminary and Rough Cost-Effectiveness Estimates 61
Cost-Effectiveness
Table A1. Base Case Assumptions
Real discount rate 0.03
Inflation 0.02
Vaccine efficacy 80%
Groups targeted from existing cohorts: HIV/AIDS 1 to 35 year olds
Groups targeted from existing cohorts: malaria 1 to 5 year olds, first-time mothers
Groups targeted from existing cohorts: tuberculosis 1 to 35 year olds
Coverage for new cohorts 75%
Coverage for existing cohorts: HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis 30%
Coverage for existing cohorts: malaria 50%
Average annual purchase cost per disease (millions) $336
Manufacturing cost per person immunized $0.50
Delivery cost: new cohorts $1.00
Delivery cost: 1-10 year olds, pregnant women $3.00
Delivery cost: 11-35 year olds $5.00
Period for which vaccination is effective lifetime
Worldwide HIV/AIDS DALY burden (millions) 70.9
Worldwide malaria DALY burden (millions) 39.3
Worldwide tuberculosis DALY burden (millions) 28.2
Table A2. Base Case Results
HIV/AIDS Malaria Tuberculosis Total
Over a ten-year horizon
Vaccinations (millions) 981 625 1656 3262
Price to developer per vaccination $3.43 $5.38 $2.03 $3.09
Average co-payment per vaccination $1.30 $0.95 $0.39 $0.77
Donor contributions needed per year (millions) $209 $277 $271 $757
Discounted DALYs saved (millions) 544 221 228 993
NPV cost per discounted DALY saved (including
co-payments)
$9.93 $18.12 $32.55 $14.67
Over an infinite horizon
NPV cost per discounted DALY saved $5.42 $8.52 $20.65 $10.47Appendix 2: Preliminary and Rough Cost-Effectiveness Estimates 62
Table A3: Sensitivity Analysis
Entries in each cell are the cost per DALY saved over an infinite horizon, and in parentheses, the
number of people vaccinated over the first ten years (in millions).
HIV/AIDS Malaria Tuberculosis
Vaccine efficacy
     30% $13.36 (846) $20.60 (479) $49.08 (1301)
     50% $8.30 (906) $13.34 (594) $30.63 (1446)
     80% $5.42 (981) $8.52 (625) $20.65 (1656)
     100% $4.34 (986) $7.85 (840) $16.70 (1684)
Cost-effectiveness threshold for coverage
     $50 per DALY $5.17 (899) $8.27 (582) $18.77 (1364)
     $100 per DALY $5.42 (981) $8.52 (625) $20.65 (1656)
     $500 per DALY $6.51 (1326) $10.64 (996) $21.17 (1720)
No. of doses required
     1 $5.42 (981) $8.52 (625) $20.65 (1656)
     2 $8.10 (899) $12.04 (571) $31.32 (1364)
     3 $9.13 (712) $13.97 (466) $37.29 (1275)
Size of fund
     $250 million $4.85 (981) $7.35 (625) $19.08 (1656)
     $336 million $5.42 (981) $8.52 (625) $20.65 (1656)
     $500 million $6.50 (981) $10.80 (625) $23.60 (1656)
Real interest rate
     3% $5.42 (981) $8.52 (625) $20.65 (1656)
     5% $8.85 (932) $11.29 (600) $34.55 (1381)
Immunization rate
base case $5.42 (981) $8.52 (625) $20.65 (1656)
2/3 base $6.53 (654) $10.82 (425) $23.69 (1104)
Table A4: Cost per DALY Saved Relative to Counterfactual in which Vaccines Were
Developed Fifteen Years Later
Access to Vaccine in First Fifteen Years HIV/AIDS Malaria Tuberculosis
All countries $23.17 $30.89 $73.49
Countries with GNP > $500 per capita $11.35 $17.08 $39.94References 63
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